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Abstract Submission Form – Papers

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Proposed title of paper: Adjudicating Moral Conflicts When There is a Fundamental Disagreement of Values

Abstract with 3 clearly stated objectives in 250 words:

In clinical consultations, ethicists help adjudicate ethical disagreements among individuals who have competing values. The participants often share enough basic values to permit them to come to some resolutions. Nevertheless, when the participants have fundamentally different values, how are we to resolve their moral differences without violating value-neutrality? Moreover, from a methodological point of view, contemporary clinical ethics relies on a set of by-and-large liberal values that place premiums on patient's autonomy and negative freedom. How is one supposed to justify these values in a non-question-begging manner? Indeed, conservative ethicists such as Leon Kass have argued that medical ethics must take into equal consideration conservative values.

The key to answering these questions adequately lies in an appreciation of our commitment to resolving ethical differences rationally. To wit, when we agree to rational conflict resolution, we agree that the only ground for limiting what another person can do is by an appeal to reason. When there is a fundamental conflict of values, no reasons can be offered to override one's values. Thus, by our commitment to rational conflict resolution, we allow individuals to do what they see fit. The goals of my paper are thus: (1) to offer a novel way to resolve ethical conflicts arising from fundamental disagreements of values; (2) to provide a value-neutral defense of apparently liberal commitments in clinical ethics; and (3) to demonstrate that all participants who are committed to rational conflict resolution must subscribe to this principle of tolerance.

If you have or will publish on this topic, please cite reference:

Are you planning to or will you be willing to submit a poster along with your paper?

Yes No